Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Posthumous notes', 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' and 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)'

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55 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]